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PROLOGUE 
Here is a too-easy torts final exam question:   
An aircraft, negligently maintained by its operator, crashes on takeoff.  The operator and 
sole passenger is killed.  In addition, the plane strikes and causes $250,000 of damage to a zoo 
that is a local tourist attraction).  For which of the following is the operator's estate liable in tort? 
• The amounts claimed by eligible persons for the "Wrongful Death" of the 
passenger; 
• The damage to the zoo; 
• The cost of a babysitter hired by the sister of the passenger, to care for the 
sister's toddler while the sister attends the passenger's funeral; 
• The loss (represented by the time value of money for the period between the 
untimely accident and the passenger's actuarial life span) to the insurance 
company that paid the proceeds of the passenger's life insurance policy to its 
designated beneficiaries; 
• The cost of overtime pay by the County to the police officers it directed to 
control traffic around the crash scene; 
• The interest costs borne by the factory worker who had to borrow money after 
being laid off when the factory that had employed him shut down.  The 
factory had shut down because it could no longer afford to pay increased 
property taxes, which the city had imposed to compensate for the loss of other 
tax revenue resulting from the decline in tourism that followed the closure of 
the zoo. 
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If you answered that the negligent aircraft operator is liable for all these damages, stop.  
Return to the classroom.  Do not collect your Law degree – for clearly, you missed the "duty," 
"causation" and "damages" segments of your Torts course.2
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 30, 1998, New Orleans became the first city in the nation to file suit against 
the firearm industry.3 Chicago followed two weeks later.4 Within a year, twenty-nine cities and 
counties had sued over forty gun manufacturers, dealers and trade associations. Most of these 
plaintiffs contend that the defendants' firearms are "defective and unreasonably dangerous" 
products as then manufactured and marketed.  The governments demanded damages for harms 
allegedly caused by those defective and unreasonably dangerous products.  So far, so good: this 
claim, however persuasive, at least respects the basic principles of product liability law.5 It 
alleges that the manufacturers acted wrongfully,6 and it demands compensation for harm 
proximately caused by this wrongdoing. 
Alas, the prima facie validity of the firearm suits ends here, for governments are not 
claiming that their property was destroyed or damaged by exploding, defective guns.  Rather, the 
gist of these suits is a demand for recovery of costs that plaintiffs incurred to treat uninsured gun-
shot victims in city hospitals; to pay for police and 911 employees' overtime; to compensate for 
 
2 Only the first two types of damage are recoverable in tort. The third type of damage is excluded if the sister is not 
named in the state's Wrongful Death Statute. 
3 Morial v. Smith & Wesson, et al., No. 98-18578 (New Orleans Parish Ct). 
4 Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., et al., No. 98-CH-015596 (Cook County Circuit Court, Chancery Div.). 
5 McPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
6 This article accepts, without discussing or in any way relying on, the position that product liability is based on 
wrongful behavior, even though most courts purport to base it on strict liability.  See, e.g., William C. Powers, Jr., 
The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 779 (1983) (“[T]he concept of fault is 
embedded in the structure of strict products liability law itself.”).  
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lost tax revenue as property values dropped in violence-infested neighborhoods; and the like.7 As 
has been documented elsewhere, these suits have been almost universally unsuccessful,8 for they 
rebuff three conditions of a valid tort suit: they fail to prove breach of a duty of care, they fail to 
establish proximate causation and they invoke non-cognizable damages.9
Some who would hold firearms manufacturers liable for expenses incurred by 
governments after the criminal use of guns take issue with the claim that the government services 
for which compensation is claimed are "free", and therefore ineligible for tort recovery.  They 
argue that government services should not "subsidize" tortfeasors, and that proper accounting 
requires tortfeasors to "internalize" social costs of their alleged misbehavior.10 They would do 
away with what they term the "free public services doctrine"11 (”FPSD”), which one author 
described as holding that “a governmental entity may not recover from a tortfeasor the costs of 
public services occasioned by the tortfeasor’s wrong.”12 Why should taxpayers pay to direct 
traffic after a collision caused by a drunk driver?  Why should the drunk (and his insurance 
company) not be charged the cost of the public ambulance used to transport victims to the 
 
7 The suit by Bridgeport, Connecticut adds a claim that gun manufacturers have violated federally protected civil 
rights because shootings take place in “predominantly minority neighborhoods.”  Eighty percent of homicide victims 
in Bridgeport are in fact members of “minority groups.”  Bridgeport does not mention that 90 percent of homicide 
defendants are also minority group members. 
8 One suit has thus far survived summary judgment.  The court in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. held that 
“a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, 
manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public.  
768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002).  The case has not yet gone back to the trial court 
9 Michael I. Krauss, Fire and Smoke: Government Lawsuits and the Rule of Law (2000). 
10 See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services from 
Tortfeasors? Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV.
727 (2002) [hereinafter Lytton].  See also David C. McIntyre, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs: 
Accounting for the True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1001 (1987); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks 
of and Reactions to Underterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691 (2005); Laura L. Gavioli, Who Should Pay: 
Obstacles to Cities in Using Affirmative Litigation as a Source of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941 (2004); Thomas C. 
Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001); 
Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, 
Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (1994). 
11 Lytton, supra note 10, at 727. 
12 Id. 
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hospital, or the fire engine used to douse the flames created by the drunk's car's collision with a 
gas pump?13 Why should the drunk be able to "externalize" all this harm? 
It is obvious to advocates of cost recoupment suits against gun manufacturers that the 
stakes in the FPSD debate are high.  One critic has recently edited a collection of articles on 
“Suing the Gun Industry,” in which he again asserts that FPSD is a “confusion” that should be 
excised from the common law of tort.14 On the other side of the political spectrum, proponents 
of federal “tort reform” have sought to specifically immunize gun manufacturers from 
recoupment suits.15 Of course such legislation, if enacted, would imply that the recoupment suits 
might have been valid in common law in the statute's absence.16 
This article contends that both camps would benefit from a thorough understanding of the 
Free Public Services Doctrine’s place within the common law of tort.  According to an FPSD 
critic, for instance, only ten states and a few federal courts follow FPSD.17 But as the Prologue's 
"exam question" suggests, FPSD is in reality an illustration of universal and fundamental 
 
13 See, e.g., Kelly J. Winding, Miscellaneous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, August 11, 1999, at E7 (reporting that 
the Pittsburgh city council voted to adopt an ordinance permitting service companies and borough officials to recoup 
fire, police, and emergency services from reckless people who cause accidents, including drunk drivers); Keith 
Stone, Conference Airs ‘Bright Ideas’ for a Better L.A., DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 17, 1996, at N3 (reporting that 
an attorney argued at a conference that Los Angeles should charge drunk drivers for the time and expense of their 
cases, so that the city can recoup some of its costs). 
14 Timothy D. Lytton, Suing the Gun Industry: A Battle at the Crossroads of Gun Control and Mass Torts 14-15 
(Timothy Lytton ed. 2005).  
15 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003) (“To 
prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or 
importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others”). 
16 A statute that is comprehensive indicates a legislative intent that the statute totally supersedes and replaces the 
common law dealing with the subject matter.  NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 50:5 (6th ed. 2005); see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 789 (1952) (holding that a 
comprehensive statute describing course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations, and exceptions excludes all 
aspects of the common law not specified by Congress in the statute). 
17 Lytton cites cases for the following states: Alaska, California, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Lytton, supra note 10, at 728-29 n.2.  He also discusses what he 
deems the “mixed” acceptance of the doctrine in federal courts. 
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common law tort concepts: duty, proximate cause and damages. Wherever these elements remain 
requirements for common law liability, public service cost recoupment should be denied.18 
Abolishing FPSD could result in government recovery of the cost of many services it 
currently provides – from firefighting costs due to careless smokers to special education required 
by children born with preventable medical problems.19 As this article shows, FPSD’s opponents 
unjustifiably confine their recoupment demands to expenditures made where the target defendant 
is a corporation. Their proposed modification of the free public services doctrine is, this article 
contends, in reality a means to further their agenda of "regulation by litigation."20 
FPSD’s opponents find the justifications offered in defense of the doctrine to be weak 
and circular.21 They challenge FPSD as unfair22 and inefficient23, and claim that FPSD springs 
from "judicial activism" that distorts common law and usurps legislatures’ policy-making 
 
18 This is why the list of jurisdictions that do not accept FPSD is far more extensive than the list of jurisdictions that 
actually mention the doctrine by name.  For example, proximate cause was invoked in Georgia in Torres v. Putnam 
County, 541 S.E.2d 133, 136 & n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing suit against defendants for the cost of sending 
county building inspector, sheriff, and deputy sheriff to inspect defendants’ land for zoning violations).  See also 
City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); 2003 Ind. LEXIS 1096, *40 (noting that the 
doctrines of remoteness and proximate cause may apply to the city’s public nuisance claim against a firearm 
manufacturer).  Lytton discusses why he believes proximate cause analysis is often different from the free public 
services doctrine at in Lytton, supra note 10, at 748-49. 
19 For an example of the expense of special education, see BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 159 (Berkley Books 1988) 
(estimating cost of special education for brain-damaged child as $47,748 a year for 16 years). 
20 Lytton, for example, has written extensively elsewhere in favor of the use of municipal and individual suits 
against gun manufacturers and dealers as a way to augment government regulation of the industry.  Timothy D. 
Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation in Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A
BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 250 (Timothy D. Lytton ed. 2005); Timothy D. 
Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000); 
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role 
for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1 (2000); Timothy D. Lytton, Negligent 
Marketing: Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms 
Manufacturers, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1998).  Galligan approves of recoupment suits against firearms and 
tobacco manufacturers because they will "equalize the relative strength of the parties.  The suit is one powerful 
entity – a governmental entity – against another, a large entity or group of entities.  [I]t is large versus large." Supra,
note 10. at  1049 
21 See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 10, at 752 (“The few opinions that give justifications provide little more than merely 
the outlines of an adequate defense of [FPSD], and they suffer from question-begging . . . .   [S]urveying the case 
law reveals that in imposing the doctrine, courts have failed to offer any convincing justification for it.”). 
22 Id. at 759. 
23 Id. at 765. 
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prerogatives. If these critics are correct, trial attorneys and judicial and economic conservatives 
should unite to condemn FPSD.24 
Contrary to this view, however, this article argues that the free public services doctrine 
does not distort tort law. FPSD is in fact an embodiment of the common law of torts; it is ridding 
tort of FPSD that would be legislating from the bench. Abolishing FPSD inside the common law 
would require defiling fundamental tort doctrines. Deploying governmental rescue services to 
mitigate the effects of misbehavior does not constitute “damages” proximately caused by that 
misbehavior.  No one owes a duty to governments to refrain from utilizing government services, 
except conceivably to refrain from maliciously calling upon them.25 Therefore any alleged 
overuse is not damage proximately caused by wrongdoing. 
This article defends FPSD by describing four flaws that undermine the anti-FPSD thesis.  
Part II details FPSD critics' most blatant failing, a defective analysis of current law.  This faulty 
analysis leads FPSD’s critics to suggest a reform that would in fact render tort law incoherent.  
Part III discusses FPSD critics’ failure to acknowledge why government services are "free."  This 
Part also rebuts two of the critics' claims: that FPSD under-deters corporations from committing 
negligent acts, and that FPSD is an instance of judicial activism.  Part IV broaches an issue that 
permeates the FPSD critique: a pervasive distrust of corporations.  The Conclusion summarizes 
 
24 Id. at 740. 
25 Thus, prank false-alarm phone calls to the fire department would arguably be fraudulent and tortious under 
common law.  Courts have allowed suits by emergency workers injured in accidents on the way to answer 
emergency calls that are later found to be false alarms.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Rzonca, 478 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1985) (city police officer injured on way to answer silent robbery alarm at bank set off by negligently supervised 
child); Daas v. Pearson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1971) (city police officer injured on way to answer 
intentional false alarm).  There is no obvious reason why municipalities could not similarly recover from plaintiffs 
for damage to city vehicles involved in such accidents.  Further, many municipalities make it a crime to falsely 
summon emergency workers.  Such statutes may be used to aid in determining the standard of care required of 
citizens.  E.g., Daas, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41. 
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the claim that FPSD must be retained as an essential component of the common law of tort, 
unless and until tort is superseded by public ordering.26 
II. FPSD AND TORT DOCTRINE 
Tort liability for negligence requires that a plaintiff allege, and produce persuasive 
evidence of: (a) the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff; (b) the defendant's breach of this duty; (c) 
the proximate and legal causation of the plaintiff’s loss from this breach; and (d) the cognizable 
damages arising from this loss.27 A compelling case can be made that tortfeasors do not owe 
any legal duty to the providers of government services.  Likewise, the discharge of government 
services does not constitute proximately caused compensable damages.  FPSD, it turns out, does 
little more than give a name to an instantiation of basic doctrines of tort. 
 
A. Duty
In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,28 the California Court of Appeal 
explained the common law doctrine of duty in this way:     
Whether intentional or negligent, a tort “involves a violation of a legal duty,
imposed by statute, contract or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person 
injured.  Without such a duty, any injury is ‘damnum absque injuria’ -- injury 
without wrong.” . . .29 
26 See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 623 (1992). 
27 PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 30, p.164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
28 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
29 Id. at 855 (citations omitted). 
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The California court in Abalone was commenting on legal duty generally, not in specific 
relation to FPSD.30 But "duty analysis" is "duty analysis", and applies fully even when used to 
deny tortfeasor liability for a byproduct of a free public rescue service.  This has classically been 
the case under the “firefighter’s rule.” Dating back to 1892, the firefighter’s rule31 precludes 
recovery in tort from a negligent landowner by a rescue worker injured while attending to the 
emergency created by the landowner's negligence.32 The original rationale for this rule against 
recovery was arguably based on property law,33 but today the firefighter’s rule is often seen as 
one of the surviving instances of the doctrine of assumption of risk.34 Like FPSD, the 
firefighter’s rule is said to bar recovery due to the lack of any duty owed to the firefighter by the 
person who negligently caused the blaze.  To the contrary, the proximate cause of the 
firefighter's injury was the firefighter's own voluntarily decision to do her job. 
The similarity between the firefighter's rule and FPSD can be seen in. Mayor & Council 
of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc.,, where both played a role.35 Two corporations were 
allegedly responsible for an explosion and ensuing fire at a fuel plant in Morgan City, Louisiana.  
The city sued both corporations to recoup the cost of fighting the fire.  In affirming the lower 
court’s denial of recovery, the Louisiana Court of Appeal stated: “We deem it unreasonable to 
hold that an owner owes it to firefighters not to let his building catch fire.  To the contrary: it is 
the firefighters’ duty to the property owners (and neighbors) to save them from their 
 
30 The court did, however, discuss the doctrine at 850-51.  After discussing Flagstaff and Air Florida, the court held 
that “a government entity may not, as the County seeks to do in this case, recover the costs of law enforcement 
absent authorizing legislation.”  Thereafter, the court determined that there was no statute authorizing such recovery.  
Id. at 851-53. 
31 The rule also applies to police officers.  See David L. Strauss, Comment, Where There’s Smoke There’s the 
Firefighter’s Rule: Containing the Conflagration After One Hundred Years, 1992 WISC. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (1992). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 2034. Courts originally considered firemen’s liability under the traditional categories of entrants upon land -
- invitees, licensees, and trespassers. Firefighters were licensees, not subject to the more strenuous duties owed to 
invitees. 
34 Id. at 2035. 
35 Mayor & Council of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
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negligence.”36 The court continued: “By assuming the responsibility of providing for such 
‘rescue’ services, the City has placed itself in a situation analogous to that of the professional 
rescuer.”37 
As Fontenot demonstrates, government's duty to provide rescue services without later 
suing for compensation, and negligent citizens' lack of duty to refrain from non-maliciously 
using government services, are two sides of he same coin.  Professors Lytton and Galligan 
dispute the relevance of this duty analysis to FPSD, however.  Galligan writes,  
"The argument that public entities exist to provide public services is a confusing 
response.  So what?  Public servies traceable to a defendant's torts ought to be 
recoverable in order to encourage efficient investments in safety."38 
Lytton, writing in a Louisiana journal, excoriates Fontenot as question-begging: 
According to the court, the government cannot recover the costs of public service 
expenditures from tortfeasors because tortfeasors owe the government no duty of 
care to prevent such losses.  Tortfeasors owe no duty because the government, 
like a professional rescuer, assumes the risk of losses incurred while providing 
services to tort victims.  The government can be said to assume the risk because 
such losses are inherent in the government’s duty to provide public services.  That 
is, the government is under a duty to provide public services free of charge.  Thus, 
the government cannot recover the costs of public services from tortfeasors 
because they are under a duty to provide such services free of charge.  The 
Fontenot court’s duty analysis ultimately amounts to a restatement, rather than a 
justification, of the free public services doctrine: the government cannot recover 
public service costs from tortfeasors because it is under a duty not to.39 
36 Id. at 687 (quoting Thompson v. Warehouse Corp. of America, 337 So. 2d 572, 573 (La. App. 1976)) (emphasis 
added). 
37 Id. at 688. 
38 Galligan, supra note 10, at 1045-6 
39 Id. at 754. 
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It is of course correct to assert that common law courts normally repeat fundamental rules 
rather than offer independent philosophical groundings for them.  This is known as applying 
established precedent.  Applying pre-existing rules is only “question-begging” in the sense that 
the Rule of Law is question-begging – the invocation of a precedent assumes the legitimacy of a 
legal rule instead of constantly re-establishing it.40 
Consider the substantive question, then.  The common law precludes recovery for free 
public service expenses; but why is this the case?  Are governments precluded from recovering 
because their expenses were in fulfillment of their own duty to provide rescue services? Is 
recovery precluded because the tortfeasor owes no duty to the government providing the service? 
Is this a distinction without a difference?  Are these two ways of phrasing the same idea? 
 
(1)  Government’s Duty to Rescue 
In 1987, FPSD opponent David McIntyre discussed the importance of "duty" in FPSD.41  
In McIntyre’s opinion, the “primary rationale” behind the general rule against municipal cost 
recovery is the assertion of a self-imposed “pre-existing duty of government to act.”42Courts 
have held that recovery of the costs of rescue from a negligent corporation whose tort led to an 
increase in such costs is precluded because government fulfilled a “governmental function” by 
providing rescue services.  In effect, governments assign themselves "duties to rescue" according 
 
40 Indeed, Lytton presents his own question-begging argument: governments should recoup public services from 
corporations because . . . well, because Lytton thinks they should. 
41 See McIntyre, supra note 10. 
42 Id. at 1009.  Courts have held that there is no positive constitutional right to government-supplied rescue services.  
Governments are free to decline to provide such services.  See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (holding city’s failure to send an emergency squad to a resident in physical distress who called for help 
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process); Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (stating, “As a general matter, the State is under no constitutional duty to provide 
substantive services for those within its border.”). 
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to the services they have established.  It is a government’s statutory self-imposition of this 
responsibility, not the tortfeasor’s common law duty to his direct victim, that is the legal source 
of costs incurred by the state.  Such was the holding in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp.,43 where the Ohio Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “the city 
may not recover for expenditures for ordinary public services which [sic] it has the duty to 
provide.”44 Similarly, in 2001 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a 1999 ruling dismissing 
the City of Bridgeport’s suit against firearm manufacturers, because the city, having provided 
public services as part of its normal civic function, lacked “any statutory authorization to initiate 
. . . claims” of liability against the firearms industry.45 
(2) Tortfeasor’s Lack of Duty to Government 
Courts have likewise rejected government attempts to recover the cost of public service 
occasioned by a tortfeasor’s negligence on the grounds that the tortfeasor owed no pre-existing 
legal duty to government.  In Fontenot, the city spent $38,000 on fire and police services to 
extinguish the fire.46 The court denied the city recovery for the cost of these services, declaring 
that any duty Fontenot, Inc. owed in handling its flammable chemicals “does not include within 
the ambit of its protection the risk that public … funds will be expended to fight a fire . . . .”47 
The defendant airline in District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., a case examined below, 
 
43 Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *1 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000), reversed and 
remanded, 768 N.E.2d 1136.  The Ohio Supreme Court, on remand, confirmed that as a general rule “a municipality 
cannot reasonably expect to recover the costs of services whenever a tortfeasor causes harm to the public. . . .”  768 
N.E.2d at 1149. 
44 Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *38. 
45 Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313 (Conn. 2001), aff’g 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1999). 
46 460 So. 2d 685, 686 (La. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
47 Id. at 688. 
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successfully made a similar argument at trial: it did not owe a “duty of due care to protect the 
District [of Columbia] from the expense of providing emergency services.”48 
A duty to government was arguably breached in New York v. Long Island Lighting Co.49 
where a county court nonetheless dismissed a state’s action to recover labor and equipment costs 
incurred to divert traffic from a road onto which the defendant’s power lines had (allegedly 
negligently) fallen.50 The state’s own property had been obstructed as a result of the allegedly 
wrongful behavior, making the government's tort case stronger than for the firearm suits.  
Notwithstanding this distinction, the court dismissed the recoupment suit on these grounds:  
“The plaintiff may not recover damages for undertaking its duty to ensure the safety of the 
traveling public . . . . Plaintiffs performed the very tasks intended by the Legislature.  They 
exercised . . . functions, powers and duties relating to traffic regulation and control.”51 
The source of the plaintiff's expenditures was its voluntarily assumed statutory duty to ensure the 
flow of traffic, not the damage to its own property by the defendant.  
In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,52 a county sued to recover money 
spent for police overtime and related costs arising from protest groups’ occupation of a 
construction site for a nuclear power plant.53 The defendants intentionally (though not 
maliciously) committed acts of trespass that they in fact hoped would result in the expenditure of 
police resources; yet even they were not held liable for those expenditures.  A fortiori must this 
be the case when a public expenditure is neither foreseen or desired. Hiking alone on the 
Appalachian Trail in the wintertime may be foolhardy, and even a dereliction of one's duty to 
 
48 District of Columbia v Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  See infra, note 103 and accompanying 
text. 
49 493 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Nassau Co. Ct. 1985).  Cited by Lytton, supra note 10, at 729 n.2. & 769 n.192. 
50 Long Island Lighting, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 256. 
51 Id. at 257. 
52 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
53 Id. at 857. 
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one's dependents and employer, but it is assuredly not a legal breach of any common law duty to 
the Park Service's mountain rescue squad. 
District of Columbia v. Air Florida,54 involved a jet that crashed into Washington’s 14th 
Street Bridge on takeoff from National Airport.  The District of Columbia sued the airline to 
recover expenditures for overtime pay and for equipment used to rescue the injured, recover the 
bodies of the dead, and raise the wreckage of the plane.55 Air Florida certainly owed a duty to its 
passengers,and to persons on the ground, not to negligently injure them or damage their 
property.  Thus, the airline owed a duty to the District of Columbia not to negligently damage the 
14th Street Bridge.  However, the airline owed no duty to the D.C. Fire Department to refrain 
from prompting use of its emergency services– rather, it is DCFD that created and assumed the 
duty (which did not exist at common law) to help Air Florida and others similarly stricken.  
Recovery is generally permitted for damage to government property arising from a tortfeasor’s 
negligence, even though recoupment is not allowed for rescue and cleanup efforts.56 Air Florida 
followed this pattern; the airline agreed to pay the District for damage to the bridge,57 but the 
city’s lawsuit against the airline for recovery of the cost of rescue services was dismissed.58 
(3)  Subrogatory Theory of Duty 
In an effort to forestall the duty-based assessment of the common law, McIntyre posits an 
agency theory that bypassed the traditional notion of duty.  He writes, “in a disaster situation a 
duty of reasonable care is owed the public at large which, in essence, is represented by the 
 
54 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
55 Id. at 1079. 
56 Lytton discusses the exception for damage to public property at Lytton, supra note 10, at 743.  McIntyre discusses 
the exception at McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1025. 
57 750 F.2d at 1079 n.1. 
58 The United States District Court (D.C.) dismissed the city's suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1078. 
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government plaintiff in a response cost recovery action.”59 Similarly, “there is no reason why a 
municipality’s financial interests should not be entitled to legal protection, particularly since it is 
suing on behalf of its taxpayers, to whom the money ultimately belongs.”60 Lytton uncritically 
paraphrases McIntyre's arguments: “Taxpayers lose when they pay to replenish public resources 
depleted by the tortfeasor, and the public at large loses whenever those resources are no longer 
available for other purposes.  In this regard, government is analogous to a corporation, whose 
losses ultimately harm shareholders.”61 
In this view, provision of government services is analogous to insurers' indemnification 
of insureds, allowing insurers de jure subrogation against the party that injured their insureds in 
some cases.  There are two problems with this argument, however.  First, subrogation requires 
that the party suing stand in the shoes of the actual victim.62 Subrogation may be invoked only if 
the direct victim herself has a legal claim against the tortfeasor, which the victim (or the law) can 
assign to the “insurer” (here, the government).63 This is a questionable proposition in the case of 
disaster responses.64 Second, if citizens did have individual causes of action against a tortfeasor, 
 
59 McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1020.  Note that Luschei analyses City of Flagstaff under a similar approach, arguing 
that the city government should have been compensated (although under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than 
in tort) for assuming the railroad's duty to rescue residents put in danger by the railroad's dangerous chemicals.  See 
Luschei, infra note 82 at 984. 
60 Id. at 1011. (our emphasis) 
61 Lytton, supra note 10, at 760.  Presumably Lytton is only concerned with corporate tortfeasors, for reasons made 
clear infra.
62 See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Courtaulds Performance Films, Inc., 580 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Va. 2003) 
("Subrogation is, in its simplest terms, the substitution of one part in the place of another with reference to a lawful 
claim, demand, or right so that the party that is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other."); Federal Land Bank 
of Baltimore v. Joynes, 18 S.E.2d 917, 920 (Va. 1942) ("Subrogation is the substitution of another person in the 
place of the creditor to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the debt."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Whaley, 3 
S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1939) (In equity, a debt paid by a surety "is treated as still subsisting and the surety stands in the 
shoes of the creditor, entitled to the same rights as the creditor was entitled to."). 
63 It is worth noting the general rule that claims for personal torts are not assignable.  See City of Richmond v. 
Hanes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961) ("The general doctrine, both at law and in equity, is that rights of action for 
torts causing injuries which are strictly personal and which do not survive are not capable of being assigned …. The 
rule was based on principles of public policy to discourage champerty and maintenance."). 
64 Cf. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825 So.2d 786, 790 (It has been long recognized "that a surety 
who pays the debt of his principal 'stands in the shoes' of the payee and may enforce the payee's rights in order to 
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their right to sue must have been assigned to the government.65 But no rights transfer or statutory 
subrogation occurred in the municipal cost recovery cases– nor were government plaintiffs 
merely seeking reimbursement for transfers made to citizens.66 
One author concedes that the "insurance collective" analogy is unsustainable.67 Lytton 
states: “It would be a mistake to view efforts by government entities to recover public service 
expenditures as subrogation actions,” because no assignment of the public’s rights has been 
made to government, and because “government entities sue in their own right for their own 
losses, which are distinguishable from the losses of their citizens.”68 Likewise, Galligan praises 
the "tactical brilliance" behind firearms and tobacco recoupment suits, because they allegedly 
"avoid the difficulties inherent in subrogation claims", including of course issues of contributory 
and comparative negligence and assumption of risk by the defendant, which all are invokable 
against a subrogated plaintiff.69 Unfortunately, without a subrogatory basis for their causes of 
action, anti-FPSD supporters are left where they started: no duty is owed by a tortfeasor to the 
fire department to minimize use of its service. In a somewhat astonishing aside, Lytton appears 
to concede all this.  He grants that “[d]uty analysis, if properly developed, might well provide 
support for the free public services doctrine.70 But he concludes that “Courts have failed . . . to 
 
seek reimbursement"); Sundheim v. Philadelphia School District, 166 A.2d 365 (Pa. 1933) (party seeking to enforce 
subrogation "must point to some equitable right through the persons in whose shoes it stands"). 
65 Trevino v. HHL Financial Servs., Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Colo. 1997) ("Subrogation is a contractual or 
statutory right pursuant to which a portion of an injured plaintiff's rights against the tortfeasor responsible for the 
injuries are assigned to the subrogee."). 
66 For a similar discussion of the legal flaws in municipal lawsuits against the gun industry, see Michael I. Krauss, 
Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 MISS. L.J. 631, 640 (2001). 
67 Lytton, supra note 10, at 751. 
68 Id. (emphasis added). Lytton does not explain how this can be consistent with his comparison of government as a 
corporation and citizens as shareholders.  Shareholder losses are presumably equal to their proportionate ownership 
share of the company’s loss. 
69 Galligan, supra note 10 at 1023-24 
70 Id. at 754. 
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offer thoughtful duty analysis when it comes to the free public services doctrine.”71 But a 
gratuitous charge of "thoughtlessness" does not a persuasive argument make.   
 
B. Proximate Causation
In the typical municipal case against firearm manufacturers, a third factor, over and 
above the government’s decision to rescue and the lack of a duty owed to government, precludes 
government tort recovery. An intervening intentional tort by one or more criminals has typically 
"broken the chain" of causation. Consistent with this doctrine, courts have found that an 
intervening crime by a third party precludes proximate causation of plaintiff's harm as a matter of 
law. 72 In most cases, for example, the criminal use of the firearm by a third party negates the 
gun-maker's liability even if the latter was in some way negligent.   In common law tort, the 
causal nexus between a plaintiff and a defendant, once created, does not extend across certain 
intervening events, including deliberate human wrongdoing.  These events interrupt the chain of 
causation that began with the defendant’s wrongdoing.73 The traditional doctrine of causal 
intervention is that “the free, deliberate, and informed act or omission of a human being, 
intended to exploit the situation created by the defendant, negatives any causal connection.”74 
Courts appear to be particularly willing to find a "break" in the "causal chain" if the 
intentional tort committed by the third party is a violent crime.  For example, in Stahlecker v. 
 
71 Id. at 751. Emphasis added. 
72 See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910), in which a tank car full of 
gasoline derailed due to defendant’s negligence, resulting in a gas leak.  Duerr, a third party, threw a match on the 
leak, starting a fire that injured the plaintiff and his house.  Defendants presented evidence that Duerr, who had been 
discharged by the defendant that morning, intentionally started the fire.  Duerr claimed, however, that he was 
unaware of the leak and was merely lighting a cigar.  The court found that the defendant was entitled to a directed 
verdict on proximate cause grounds if the jury found that Duerr acted maliciously.  Id. at 151. 
73 Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 827 (2000).  
74 HART AND HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 136 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis omitted).   
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Ford Motor Co.,75 the court upheld a demurrer for a tire and a car manufacturer in a wrongful 
death suit where a motorist was murdered after being stranded when one of her car's tires 
failed.76 The court held that even if the tire was defective and unreasonably dangerous, it was 
not the proximate cause of the motorist’s murder by a third party who encountered her alone in 
an inoperable vehicle, because the criminal act by the murderer negated any causal relationship 
between the motorist and the manufacturer.77 
C. Damages
FPSC opponents do not address damages as methodically as they do duty and causation,78 
but they do consider municipalities to be directly damaged when they deploy emergency services 
in response to negligent (corporate) tortfeasors.  Indeed, the claim seems to be that government 
damages are more intensely suffered than are private damages, because when government is a 
tort victim, we are all victims: 
Viewing the government as a tort victim undermines the idea that somehow 
public services are free, as the doctrine suggests.  The costs of suppressing 
negligently started fires or cleaning up oil spills or rescuing airline crash victims 
are losses to society as a whole; they drain resources away from other private or 
government activities. . . .  Allowing government to sue for these losses in tort 
shows them to be real costs that someone must bear, not merely free services.  If 
the tortfeasors whose conduct occasions these costs do not bear them, then all of 
us will.79 
75 667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003). 
76 Id. at 258. 
77 Id. 
78 Lytton does note that economic damage arguments frequently do appear “alongside” FPSD dicta. See Lytton, 
supra note 10, at 749. This curious inversion allows Lytton to mask the fact that the economic damages rule is "part 
of" FPSD, not "alongside" it.  Lytton commits the same mistake apropos proximate causation, opining that because 
of the proximate causation requirement, “[e]ven in the absence of the free public services doctrine, most types of 
law enforcement expenditures would remain unrecoverable.” Id. at 770.  What this misses is that FPSD exists in part 
because of proximate causation, not apart from it. 
79 Id. at 779. 
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Under this view, government damages are a straightforward proposition; one dollar spent 
by a city fire department to save the property of a negligent defendant constitutes a dollar’s 
worth of “damage” to the city.  After all, that dollar was not “free”; it has been “drained away” 
from other governmental activities. 
There are two problems here.  One is that negligently caused economic loss without 
accompanying physical harm or damage to the plaintiff is generally not recoverable.69 Another 
difficulty was suggested by an economic expert witness for the defendant oil company in the 
mammoth Amoco Cadiz80 case.  There, the Seventh Circuit had to consider whether FPSD could 
protect Amoco from costs incurred by the French government to clean up an oil spill Amoco had 
(allegedly negligently) caused off the coast of Brittany.  The quesetion was whether some of the 
claimed damages existed at all: 
One could say . . . that there is a difference between proprietary and strictly 
governmental operations because the proprietary arms of the government have 
other things to do.  If the workers of the Electricity Board were not repairing the 
lines damaged by the plane, they could be constructing new lines; if the staff of 
the phone company were not tracing a freeloader’s calls, they could be hooking 
up new phones.  But if the sailors of the French Navy were not skimming oil 
[from the Cadiz spill], what would they be doing?  Invading some neighbor?  On 
this view governmental operations are different because the opportunity costs of 
their employees and equipment are zero.  If they were not being used in the 
cleanup, they would have no productive use at all.81 
69 See Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 
(1998); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 
200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Byrd v. English. 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).   
80 See Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 
(1998); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 
200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Byrd v. English. 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903). 
81 Id. at 1313-14.  In the end, the Seventh Circuit did not find this argument terribly persuasive, stating in dicta that 
the French government most likely took the probability of such events into account when it decided how many ships 
to build and how many sailors were required to staff them.  Id. at 1314. 
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Some commentators have countered  that the opportunity cost of dousing a particular fire 
is de minimis, and that governments are truly harmed only when they must supply emergency 
services above and beyond a “normal” base level. McIntyre took this position, advocating 
liability “only for extraordinary or excessive costs.  Common accidents would not trigger 
liability because such accidents are within the zone of risk anticipated by response services.”82 
Erich Rolf Luschei also defended this view in a 1986 article advocating user charges for 
tortfeasors who negligently cause “excessive use of the government service.”83 Luschei 
explained that limiting recoupment suits to excessive use “serves two purposes.  First, it permits 
‘subsidy,’ or cost spreading, for ’ordinary’ levels of public services.  Second, it eliminates the 
government’s costs of litigation by limiting the right of action.”84 We may feel entitled to some 
use of public services through the payment of our taxes, but excessive use should incur tort 
liability to the state.85 
Under an “excessive expenditure” theory, “ordinary” government rescue costs such as 
police and firefighter salaries, or the purchase and maintenance of "standard" equipment, would 
be non-recoverable damages.  Presumably, some standard level of service for each taxpayer -- 
perhaps one call each to police and fire departments each year? -- would be permitted without the 
government attempting to recoup expenses.  Above the standard level of service, however, if 
wrongdoing underlay the expenditure, costs could be recouped by the government agency, 
through either a flat-rate "user fee," an individualized tax bill based on the actual cost of the 
 
82 McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1017.  Because “disasters” conceivably could be caused by individuals as well as 
corporations, McIntyre did not advocate limiting disaster response recovery lawsuits to corporate tortfeasors.  For 
his definition of “disasters,” see McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1001, n.10. 
83 Erich Rolf Luschei, Government Recovery of Emergency Service Expenditures: An Analysis of User Charges, 19 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 993 (1986). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 974, n.15. 
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service, or a common law tort suit to recoup "excess" expenditures.86 Alternatively, government 
rescue services might be financed much as water service is billed, by individually calculating 
fees based on the level of protection required (pumper? tanker? long hose?) ex ante for a 
particular property rather than through indirect financing methods such as property tax.87 One 
proposal for funding fire protection makes fees a function of a formula that includes the property 
value, size of the property, number of occupants, and the ex ante probability of fire.88 In such a 
system, collective loss-spreading is reduced but deterrence (see below) enhanced through the 
granting of discounts off the "tax" bill for the installation of protective systems like smoke 
detectors and sprinklers.89 
This of course has everything to do with insurance and nothing to do with tort– for under 
this plan, actuarially correct ex ante risk, not ex post corrective justice, determines the "premium" 
(not the "award")  to be paid by each “insured” (not each "defendant") to the municipal 
government.90 Such proposals do bear a resemblance to some anarcho-capitalistic visions for 
abolishing government; private fire insurance carriers originally fought fires and contractually 
 
86 Such legal action need not be tort-based.  Liability might result from abnormal use of a government service, under 
public ordering, i.e., whether fault-based or not.  Thus, a system of fees could be instituted, such as that used in the 
mid-1990s at Yosemite National Park to recover the cost of search-and-rescue missions for hikers and climbers.  In 
1996 the Park billed two rock climbers found guilty by a U.S. magistrate of “creating a hazardous condition” for the 
cost of their rescue: $13,325.  Christopher Reynolds, Much Talk, Little Action on Charging for Rescues, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1998, at L2. 
87 Such proposals are popular with anarcho-capitalists who believe that services such as fire protection are private 
rather than public goods.  See, e.g., ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL 62 (Universe Books 1980). 
88 This proposal was suggested by William Pollack to encourage spending to shift from fire suppression to fire 
prevention, and a form of it was adopted by Inglewood, California in 1978.  Id. at 62-63.  As mentioned in POOLE,
supra note 87, , private fire insurers originally both fought fires and paid for damages. 
89 Id. 
90 Corrective justice posits that resources are transferred from one party to another in the tort system in order to 
compensate for damage wrongly inflicted by the first party on the second party.  See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE 
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995).  See also Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory 
of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 (1997). 
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compensated their clients (with subrogation rights against fire-setters) for fire damages they did 
not succeed in preventing.91 But none of this involves wrongdoing –none of this sounds in tort. 
 
In fact, municipal tort recoupment suits are seen as means to replenish government 
treasuries. Overtime costs,92 outlays for the acquisition of specialized equipment93 or supplies 
purchased for a specific rescue94 have been claimed.  In City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 
discussed below, the court noted that the city was claiming a common law right to sue for 
“excessive use of its fire department.”95 D.C.,  in Air Florida, asked for “extraordinary expenses” 
borne by the District and occasioned by the airline crash.96 In the litigation following the 
accident at Three Mile Island, the Third Circuit provisionally declined to ratify the District 
court’s ruling that deployment of emergency personnel by local communities was unrecoverable 
under FPSD.97 The District court had granted summary judgment because “[t]he type of damages 
claimed is similar to that produced by other man-made catastrophes such as fires, explosions, 
collapsing structures and the like,”98 but the Third  
Circuit held that the issue of whether a “nuclear incident” is an exceptional hazard not 
subject to ordinary government services was a new question to be resolved at trial.99 
91 POOLE, supra note 87. Ironically, proposals like Pollack’s would transform firefighters into monopoly insurers, 
turning on its head the anarcho-capitalist dream. 
92 See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 719 F.2d 322,at 323 (9th Cir. 1983); Morgan 
City v.; Fontenot, 460 So. 2d 685,at 687 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 62, 468 N.E.2d 
1,at 8 (N.Y. 1984); and City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J. Super. 1976). 
93 See, e.g., City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 50; and Fontenot, 460 So. 2d at 686.  According to McIntyre, Air Florida 
involved rental by the District of Columbia of cranes to lift plane wreckage from the Potomac River.  McIntyre, 
supra note 10, at 1005 n.27. 
94 Part of the costs Pennsylvania sued to recover in Three Mile Island related litigation was for emergency supplies.  
In Re TMI, 710 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1983). 
95 369 A.2d at 54 (emphasis added). 
96 750 F.2d 1077,at 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984).. 
97 Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utilities Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983). 
98 Id. at 121. 
99 Id. The issue was never resolved.  The parties settled the case without another trial.  McIntyre, supra note 10 at 
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On the other hand, many have noted the anomaly of governments seeking common law 
reimbursement from some for services long provided without charge to others. In the gun lawsuit 
filed by Boston,100 the court summarized cases applying FPSD in these words: 
Fires, fuel spills and ruptured gas mains are all frequent happenings which, while 
every effort is made to prevent them, can be expected to occur.  Train derailments 
and airplane crashes are more unusual, but not so rare that a municipality can 
never expect to have to respond to such an emergency. . . . [S]uch contingencies 
are part of the normal and expected costs of municipal existence, and absent 
legislation providing otherwise are costs to be allocated to the municipality’s 
residents through taxes.  In addition, in those cases there is no evidence that the 
specific defendants had engaged in a repeated course of conduct causing recurring 
costs to the municipality.101 
In recent years, cash-strapped, high-end communities have struggled to discourage 
excessive use of public services.  These efforts have not usually taken the form of recoupment 
suits.  In 1986 the Ventura County, California fire department weighed whether to fine parents 
up to $10,000 for wildfires caused by their children.102 A former chief of the Ventura fire 
department explained the rationale: “It was felt that it was not fair to the average taxpayer to bear 
the brunt of suppression costs of fires that were set either deliberately or by gross negligence.103 
Apparently extinguishing such fires, for the fire department, was “over and above our normal 
service.104 Ojecting with what reads as a classic defense of FPSD, the father of a suspected child 
arsonist told a reporter: “I feel it’s the [fire] department’s civic duty [and not mine] to take care 
 
1032 n.175. 
100 City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 at *33-34. 
101 Id. 
102 Mack Reed, Parents of Fire Starters Smoldering Over the Bill, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at B1. 
103 Id. at B1. 
104 Id. 
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of [fires].”105 Of course, on basic tort principles a (negligent or intentional) fire-setter is liable for 
property she destroys – the issue in Ventura was whether a parent who was not liable for his 
child under California common law should nonetheless be liable for cleanup costs, as opposed to 
the property actually burned.  Crucial to the case, however, was the fact that the county's suit was 
authorized by state legislation that superseded common law.106 
Many communities impose regulatory fees for those who “overuse” rescue services.  
Debates over such fees probe the nature of government service and of community self-help.  For 
example, to cut down on abuse of the “911” emergency telephone system, the Los Angeles City 
Council imposed fees on anyone who called the city fire department for routine medical 
treatment in 1991.107 A newspaper report noted that “paramedics say some of the most 
demanding [911] callers are wage-earning citizens who complain that they are taxpayers who 
have a right to city ambulance service.”108 Fairfax County, Virginia in 2004 enacted fees of $300 
to $550 for residents requiring the use of emergency ambulance service.109 Not all citizens 
thought the new fees were fair; one complained, “[w]e pay the highest taxes in the [Washington, 
D.C.] area; we shouldn’t have to pay for emergency ambulance service.”110 
Often quasi-criminal legislation recoups costs associated with antisocial behavior.  Faced 
with thousands of calls for police to check out burglar alarms, in recent years numerous 
municipalities have issued citations to citizens whose security systems repeatedly sound false 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. California’s Health & Safety Code § 13009 authorizes actions by government agencies to recover the costs of 
fire suppression and emergency services connected to fighting negligently or illegally set fires. 
107 Laurie Becklund, Fire Dept. Plays it Safe by Responding to All 911 Calls, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at A1. 
108 Id. 
109 Jim McElhatton, Fairfax to Levy Ambulance Fee, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at B2.  The fees would vary 
based on the level of emergency services required.  Additionally, citizens would be charged $7.50 per mile.  Lisa 
Rein, Fairfax Jobs for Retarded Renewed, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at B1. Clearly this was an effort to fund 
municipal services through employees' health insurance plans – it is highly doubtful that the county would pursue an 
uninsured taxpayer personally for ambulance services.  Medical insurance is "invisible" (paid for nominally by 
employers in whole or in part), while taxes are often all-too "visible" come election time. 
110 Letters to the Editor, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at T4 (Fairfax Extra section). 
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alarms.111 Virginia law allows localities to charge for expenses associated with emergency 
responses to DUI violations and similar traffic offenses.112 A companion statute allows Virginia 
localities to recover expenses incurred in an emergency response to a terrorism hoax.113 Of 
course, fines are also user fees in some cases: traffic tickets may be seen as a charge for the 
approximate cost of rescuing those involved in private misuse of the public highways.  The key 
characteristic of all these measures is that they are enacted legislatively. They are state 
regulations of its relationships with citizens, i.e., manifestations of public ordering.114 None of 
these fines or fees is seen as a common law tort liability.115 Public debate over user fees shows 
that these questions are, at their core, concerned with the fundamental nature of the polity. Many 
taxpayers do not view city rescue expenditures as “damage” to a “victim,” but rather as outlays 
incurred as a matter of public policy, to be "funded" in a fair manner, to be determined after 
public debate. Of such public affairs the common law is not made. 
 
III. FPSD and Policy
Despite this article's efforts to portray tort as "non-instrumental", i.e., as a mechanism of 
corrective justice without any overarching social goal, the reader may not be persuaded.  Such is 
the pull of "policy studies" today that many are sure that every legal rule must conceal a hidden 
or explicit policy judgment, i.e., that public and private law compartments are far from 
 
111 See, e.g., Lewis Kamb, Burglar Alarms Cry Wolf – Police Cry Foul, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11, 
2001, at A1. 
112 Va. Code Ann. § 15-1716 (West 2005) (originally enacted in 1997).  The statute allows localities to charge a 
$250 flat fee, or a per-minute fee not to exceed $1,000.  Note, however, that routine non-emergency services 
resulting in a DUI conviction are not recoverable under the statute, consistent with the statute having carved out a 
narrow exception to the common law FPSD.  See Va. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 04-054, 2004 WL 2361387 (Va. Att’y 
Gen. 2004). 
113 Va. Code Ann. § 15-1716.1 (West 2005) (originally enacted in 2002). 
114 See, e.g., Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, supra note 26; Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as 
Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort, supra note 66 (comparing private ordering and public ordering). 
115 The malicious terrorist phone call comes closest to being a tort – but the plaintiff would have to be the intended 
victim, who could sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
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watertight.  This essay's view, controversial but widely held,116 is that tort's sole purpose is "to be 
tort," to establish liability when and only when duty, breach, causation and cognizable damages 
are present.  As we have seen, this vision of tort buttresses FPSD.  But the defense of FPSD need 
not rely on this foundational argument. Even assuming their relevance, we can dismiss the 
"policy arguments" that allegedly undergird the criticism of the Free Public Services Doctrine, at 
least as it pertains to corporate defendants. 
 A. The Red Herring Called Deterrence
The case against FPSD typically holds that free public services generate an "externality:" 
"too much" of the behavior the public service serves to remedy.  "Internalizing" this "externality" 
will result in optimal deterrence.  Taxes, fees and fines won't accomplish this adequately, it is 
said, so tort law must take up the slack. In particular, critics claim that corporations create a need 
for substantial public services, but won't "pay their way" unless we abrogate FPSD. Luschei 
maintains that "[c]harging tortfeasors for the cost of emergency services may reduce the  
frequency and severity of tortious behavior."117 Galligan writes that suits by governments 
against tortfeasors play a "key role" in providing "efficient deterrence, as legal economists use 
that term."118 McIntyre argues that "tortfeasor liability for the cost of disaster response services 
wold more accurately reflect the true cost of accidents than does he present system of localized 
taxpayer subsidies."119 
As regards the corporations that (we will see) critics particularly target, note that 
corporate tortfeasors cannot typically direct damage onto municipal services. Corporations bear 
full liability as tortfeasors for harm they negligently or intentionally cause to persons and 
 
116 .  See, e.g., WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, PASSIM.
117 Luschei, supra note 83, at 972.   
118 Galligan, supra note 10, at 1020. 
119 McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1015. 
Public Services Meet Private Law   ©Michael I. Krauss 2006 Page 27 of 53 
 27 
property, including of course government property.  In addition, a corporation internalizes harm 
inflicted on its own property and business model. Corporate tortfeasors can rarely be confident 
that their negligence will require the deployment of, say, the municipal fire department, without 
damaging nearby businesses or the company’s own storage facility, for both of which the 
corporation is presumably already adequately deterred.120 
The deterrence argument must be that tort law underdeters corporate tortfeasors because 
a fraction of the social cost of their (wrongful) behavior is borne by the public weal.  Note 
however that this claim applies to every negligent action, by a corporation or an individual, that 
has been perpetrated since the common law of tort evolved.  For example, negligent behavior 
results in liability only for proximately caused harm, thereby “externalizing” remote "but-for" 
costs.  The deterrence argument might therefore entail the disappearance of the notion of 
proximate causation, as economic analysts like Guido Calabresi have in fact advocated.121 Tort 
law’s "economic loss" doctrine may also be a culprit from this perspective. The driver who 
negligently causes an accident on the George Washington Bridge during New York's rush hour 
does not owe compensation to the thousands of commuters who lose pay because their arrival at 
work is delayed, or to the employers who lose profit because their workers are delayed, or to the 
police departments that incur overtime expenditures redirecting traffic.  Without this revolution 
in Tort, there might be “too many” breakdowns on the George Washington Bridge during rush 
hour.  
As noted, deterrence-based arguments like these are simply not persuasive to those who 
ground tort law on notions of corrective justice, and for whom proximate causation properly 
 
120 And of course corporate reputation would invariably be affected by wrongdoing, to the direct detriment of the 
corporate tortfeasor, absent any tort award. 
121 Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 
(1975). 
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encapsulates the corrective demand.122 Even for economic theories of tort based on "Kaldor-
Hicks" wealth maximization123 and deterrence, the argument against FPSD is vulnerable.124 But 
in any case, FPSD critics do not advance this argument – for they do not advocate the general 
abolition of proximate causation, the economic loss doctrine, and duty analysis.  They appear to 
care only, and peculiarly, about corporate negligence provoking one kind of remote economic 
harm, rescue services. For that narrow subset of remote results of wrongdoing the deterrence 
argument is quite simply unavailable to them, if they wish to be coherent. 
Negligent defendants typically don't dispute that they are liable  for physical damage to 
governmental property, and for costs incurred to protect property (public and private) from 
physical damage.  Such was the situation in Amoco Cadiz.125 The Seventh Circuit noted: “The 
bulk of the expenses were incurred [by France] in protecting and restoring public property.  
Amoco concedes that France is entitled to compensation for such costs. . . .”126 The primary 
dispute in Amoco Cadiz was whether France padded its bill by failing to adequately “separate the 
costs of protecting proprietary interests from other expenses. . . .”127 Similarly, in Air Florida128 
the D.C. government’s suit to recover public service expenditures was ultimately unsuccessful, 
but the airline quickly conceded liability for $70,000 in damage done to DC's 14th Street 
Bridge.129 In the seminal FPSD case City of Briegeton v B.P. Oil, Inc., the New Jersey Superior 
 
122 See Weinrib , THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90; (1995); Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private 
Ordering,supra note 26, at 625-27. Galligan replies, with candor for his revolutionary goals, that "corrective 
justice…is not reflective of our post-millennium reality."  Galligan, supra note 10, at 1030. 
123 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); contra Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980).   
124 See, e.g., W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (defending tort law’s refusal to 
grant damages for “economic loss” on deterrence grounds). 
125 In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992). 
126 Id. at 1310-11. 
127 Id. at 1310. 
128 District of Columbia v. Air Florida, 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
129 Al Kamen, District Agrees to Settlement by Air Florida, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1983, at B8.  The airline and the 
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Court denied recovery for fire department costs to contain a spill on defendants' land, bt noted 
that "if the city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it, like all landowners, 
may recover damages caused by the escape."130 
Looming in the background of this very partial deterrence argument is a seeming bias 
against corporations.  For example, Lytton argues that “there is no relation between the tax rates 
of … corporations and the costs of the public services that their activities occasion,” resulting in 
underinvestment in safety.131 That corporate tax rates have no intrinsic relation to public service 
consumption is incontrovertible.  But there is an equally weak link between tax rates of 
individuals and the cost of the public services these individuals’ activities occasion. Do we know 
whether individuals "subsidize" corporations on this account or vice versa, or whether, as seems 
to me more likely, some individuals and corporations "subsidize" other individuals and 
corporations?  One wonders why, for example, those opposed to FPSD do not channel their 
concern with deterrence by addressing the possibility that large numbers of individuals (for 
instance, those who decline to evacuate their homes in the face of an approaching hurricane) 
systematically underinvest in safety because they expect government to bail them out.  If 
deterrence is a primary rationale for abolishing FPSD, should individuals also be required to pay 
for emergency services they use? 
As compared with individuals, corporations arguably have a greater desire to take extra 
care to guard against public service expenditures due to their negligence, because corporations 
are more solvent than individuals, because they (unlike most individuals) have goodwill that 
 
plane’s manufacturer also settled out of court with nearly all of the survivors and victims’ relatives for around $50 
million less than two years after the crash occurred, in one of the quickest air crash settlements ever.  Kenneth 
Bredermeier, $50 Million Paid in Air Florida Crash Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1983, at A1. 
130 City of Bridgeton v B.P.Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49. at 55. 
131 Lytton, supra note 10, at 766. 
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cannot be adequately protected by insurance,132 and because they are more likely to self-insure 
even for physical damages proximately caused by their negligence.133 Insurance surely dulls 
incentives,134 but even insured-against harms damage corporate goodwill. Corporations feel 
pressure to avoid the negative publicity that no doubt results from disasters such as the Air 
Florida crash, the Cadiz oil spill, or the Three Mile Island incident.135 Individuals’ incentives to 
behave non-negligently are arguably much more dulled by insurance (or by "free" rescue 
services) than are corporations’.  Even if damage from a corporate disaster has been somehow 
largely confined to expenditures made by government for rescue, containment, and cleanup, 
citizens will harbor negative feelings toward the corporation for using up these communities' 
scarce resources.136 These feelings often get translated into hefty punitive damages awards for 
physical damages caused, which surely deter and quite possibly over-deter, and to which 
corporations are almost uniquely vulnerable.137 Indeed, protection of goodwill is one reason why 
corporations (though rarely individuals) frequently reimburse victims for damages they are not 
 
132 See Joseph R. Dancy, Electronic Media, Due Diligence, and the New Industrial Revolution, 53 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. 72, 80 (1999) (stating that in if a company has “a traditional insurance program like [most] companies, chances 
are the company has little or no coverage for . . . serious damage caused to its goodwill . . . .”). 
133 Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in Commercial Leases, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 490 
(2002) (“[M]any large companies self-insure risks of loss to others caused by their negligence . . . .”); see also 
Douglas R. Richmond, Self-Insurance and the Decision to Settle, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 987, 996 (1995) (“Self-
insurance has become increasingly popular among commercial entities . . . .”).  
134 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1971).  Health insurance in particular 
creates numerous moral hazard problems.  Mark V. Pauly, Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, AM. ECON. REV.
Vol. 58 (No. 3), 531 (1968). 
135 For example, after the Exxon Valdez disaster off the cost of Alaska in 1989, consumer advocate Ralph Nader and 
several environmental groups called for a boycott of the company.  Philip Shabecoff, Six Groups Urge Boycott of 
Exxon, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A17. 
136 In an era of global communication, anger about large industrial accidents need not only be confined to 
communities located near the site of the disaster.  For example, after a pesticide plant leaked deadly chemicals in 
Bhopal, India in 1994 killing more than 2,000, name recognition among Americans of Union Carbide, the majority 
shareholder of the plant, increased greatly, as did negative feelings toward the company.  Stuart Jackson, Union 
Carbide’s Good Name Takes a Beating, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec.31, 1984-Jan. 7, 1985, at 40. 
137 For example, Exxon was ordered to pay $4.5 billion in punitive damages for the 1989 spill resulting from the 
grounding of the Valdez off the coast of Alaska.  Susan Beck, $1.3 Bil. in Fees Awarded in Exxon Valdez Litigation,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March 9, 2004, at 5.  Over-deterrence in such a case might be declining to ship oil in the 
first place. 
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obliged to pay in tort, as well as for damages suffered by third parties through no fault of the 
corporation at all.138 
It is reckless to assume, sans data, that corporations (alone among tortfeasors) have 
insufficient incentive to prevent or limit the scope of disasters.  Unless a corporation is fly-by-
night or insolvent -- in which case the abolition of FPSD would not affect anything -- it will be 
sensitive to reputational loss as well as to court-ordered payments. Complex empirical studies 
could determine whether the current net incentive is in some sense “optimal” and, if it is 
somehow “suboptimal,” whether this “suboptimality” is the result of bankruptcy law, damages 
rules, insurance rules, agency problems resulting from limited liability, or from some other 
feature of American law.  The selective use of deterrence rationale to justify abrogating FPSD, 
and for corporations only, is unpersuasive.   
 
B. Policy Reasons Why Public Services Are Supplied by Governments
There is one policy question sometimes hinted at by critics of FPSD, but which they fail 
to substantially address: should governments supply public services at zero marginal cost to 
users, whether the user be an individual or a corporation?   
 
138 Although the law was unclear as to whether manufacturers were liable for injuries caused by criminal product-
tampering, in 1991 Johnson & Johnson settled with the families of the seven Chicago-area residents who died nine 
years earlier after taking Tylenol that had been laced with cyanide.  Although few of the terms of settlement were 
made public, they included college education funds for the eight children whose parents had died in the tragedy.  P. 
Davis Szymczak, Settlement Reached in Tylenol Suit, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 14, 1991, at 1. 
In the well-known case of Bolton v. Stone, a woman sued a neighboring cricket club after being hit and injured while 
standing outside her home by a ball that had strayed from the playing field.  1951 App. Cas. 850.  One of the judges 
appeared surprised that, although legal liability did not lie in tort because the accident was held to be unforeseeable, 
the defendant club “offer[ed] no more consolation to his victim than the reflection that a social being is not immune 
from social risks. . . .”  Id. 
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The answer to this question is a function of one's view of the proper role of government.  
For an extreme communitarian, all losses are “our losses,” so they should perhaps all be borne by 
“us.” The New Zealand plan, abolishing much of tort law to pay for accidents from the public 
fisc, reflects such a view.139 Alternatively perhaps government should be a subrogated insurer, a 
clearinghouse for corrective justice transfers but an ultimate bearer of no losses itself whenever 
tortfeasors are solvent. But should government be doing something that, say, State Farm 
Insurance Co. can do?  These are important questions for political philosophy, and tangentially 
for tort theory.  Surely such questions should be the fulcrum of a critique of FPSD.  Alas, critics 
of FPSD have not felt the need to address them.  
Protection provided by government in times of adversity surely spreads costs.  
Corporations are not the only beneficiaries of this protection.  Corporations are, after all, in 
essence nexi of contracts among individuals.140 Corporate employees, officers and shareholders 
may all be comforted knowing that government will be there to provide public services when 
needed by a corporation, which will not be billed for them afterward.141 If "free" public 
protection was extended only to individuals, this modification of tort law would be equivalent to 
a tax on the corporate form.  FPSD critics142 fail to show why such a tax is needed, i.e., why 
 
139 In the mid-1960s, the government of New Zealand commissioned a study of the country's workers' compensation 
system.  The Royal Commission was simply to make suggestions with respect to workers'compensation but instead 
ended up recommending abolition of the tort system across the board. Following the Royal Commission study, in 
1974, New Zealand enacted a no-fault accident compensation system to replace tort remedies for accidents resulting 
in personal injuries. See Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1989) (describing the compensation scheme in New Zealand). 
140 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12, 15-17 
(1991). 
141 Lytton seems to want to make a public example of corporations experiencing disasters.  He admits that 
“[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage litigation -- well publicized in the case of industrial accidents -- that 
portrays these losses as costs for which someone must take responsibility.”  Lytton, supra note 10 at 780. 
142 In addition to those already mentioned, note that Galligan's "public torts" are directed at manufacturers.  
Galligan, supra note 10, at 1023.  McIntyre focuses on large-scale disasters not typically caused by individuals.  
McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1003. 
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current corporate taxes are "too low."  Why are they not "just right", or even, perhaps, "too 
high"?   
Emergency services, often originally provided by private enterprise,143 have evolved to 
become proprietary government functions for reasons that can be understood economically and 
philosophically.  Economically, government services sometimes have characteristics of public 
goods that cannot be provided privately.144 The production of emergency services arguably 
generates pervasive benefits for which private providers may be unable to charge.  Like national 
security, the availability of emergency services may benefit everyone in the community, whether 
each individual pays for them or not.  Providing such goods for some necessarily means 
providing them for all.145 Economists refer to this kind of benefit as a "neighborhood effect." 
Unless producers of public goods can extract payments from every user of a service, each 
member of the community has an incentive to "free-ride" on the willingness of others to pay for 
them.  No private producer will step in to satisfy a general demand for such services because no 
producer can extract profits from free-riding consumers.  Spread across a community, the twin 
problems of neighborhood effects and free-riding can result in market failure – an unsatisfied 
demand for a beneficial good.146 
Philosophically, through the political process, we have generally resolved that public 
funding of some services is just. Modern notions of individual autonomy suggest that it is 
 
143 DAVID BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 1890-
1967 (2000). In the seventeenth century, firefighting was connected to fire insurance and was therefore privately 
provided.  See Harry M. Johnson, The History of British and American Fire Marks, J. OF RISK & INSURANCE, Vol. 
39 (No. 3) 405, 406 (1972).  The earliest public firefighting company in England was not formed until 1866.  Id. at 
407.  In colonial America, collective, mutual-assistance firefighting companies predated private insurance. Private 
companies insuring against, as well as fighting and reimbursing volunteer companies who fought fires on the 
property of their insurance customers, arose in the mid-1700s.  Id. at 414-17. 
144 See generally R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
145 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 43-44 
(1979). 
146 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 46-50 (Liberty Fund 
2000) [1975]; and BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 271-77 (1990). 
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inappropriate to allow the market to determine who receives vital services like police and fire 
protection.  Market distribution of such services would arguably favor the wealthy and well-
organized at the expense of the poor and helpless.  The moral sensibilities of most recoil at the 
suggestion that the poor should only receive sub-standard or unresponsive police or fire 
protection because they are "not willing" to pay for more. 
This understanding appears to underlay the New Jersey Superior Court’s eloquent 
opinion in City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil.147 Granting defendants’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit by 
which a city sought reimbursement for salaries it paid to contain an oil spill, the court declared: 
“It has been stated that ‘It cannot be a tort for government to govern.’  Neither is government a 
saleable commodity.”148 Calling attention to the fact that fire protection had once been a private 
function, the court affirmed that it was assuredly a government duty now.149 The reason behind 
the transformation was explained the following way: 
Governments, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, have been 
instituted among men to do for the public good those things which the people 
agree are best left to the public sector.  Since our country was founded there has 
developed a widening horizon of public activity.  True, certain activities have 
developed in areas from which revenue has been derived, such as turnpikes, water 
or power supply, or postal services.  Nevertheless, there remains an area where 
the people as a whole absorb the cost of such services -- for example the 
prevention and detection of crime.  No one expects the rendering of a bill (other 
than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief.  The services of fire fighters are 
within this ambit and may not be billed as a public utility. . . . 
[A] municipal corporation may not recover as damages the costs of its 
governmental operations which [sic] it was created to perform. . . .  Thus, if the 
 
147 City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
148 Id.City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 54 (quoting Amelchenko v. Freehold, 42 N.J. 542, 550 (1964)). 
149 Id. 
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city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it, like all 
landowners, may recover damages caused by this escape.  It cannot, however, 
recover costs incurred in fire protection or extinguishment.  That is the very 
purpose of government for which it was created.150 
Bridgeton has proven influential – and for good cause.151 The idea that the nature and 
functions of government are to be decided in the public political arena, not through private law 
adjudication, is foundational to FPSD.  The Ninth Circuit conceded as much in City of Flagstaff 
v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway152 when it held that “the cost of public services for 
protection from a fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole. . . .153 The court 
concluded: 
Even if we were satisfied [which we are not] that we had the information to 
choose the more "efficient cost avoider" in this case . . . an added factor counsels 
deference to the legislature.  Here governmental entities themselves currently bear 
the cost in question, and they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere.  If the 
government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of economic efficiency, or 
even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the decision implicates fiscal 
policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the court, 
is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns.154 
Cases like Bridgeton and Flagstaff reflect courts' crucial insight into the differences 
between private and public law. Services the collectivity has chosen to provide are publicly 
 
150 Id. at 54-55. 
151 For example, the “Declaration of Independence” rationale in Bridgeton was quoted in Fontenot, 460 So.2d 685, 
at 688 (La. Ct. App. 1984), and City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).  
A few of the cases citing Bridgeton as a basis for their decisions include Koch v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 62 468 
N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 1984); Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Construction Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1987); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601 at *39 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000), 
rev’d, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). 
152 City of Flagstaff v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983). 
153 Id. at 323. 
154 Id. at 323-24. 
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funded goods until this is otherwise decided in the political arena. Government can fund 
activities in various ways: by instituting user fees, by establishing funding lotteries, or by 
imposing taxes, including taxes on corporations if it is thought that they are not paying their "fair 
share."  Criminals can be charged for the police work leading to their arrest;155 convicts can be 
charged a "hotel bill."156 Public ordering aside, courts must not shift public costs as a common 
law function. To follow FPSD opponents' prescription would be to make an end-run around the 
political process and to engage in exactly the judicial regulation, and the usurpation of tort law, 
that Lytton, for one, purports to condemn.157 
C. Judicial Policy Making
It is in labeling the free public services doctrine "judicial policy making" that FPSD 
opponents make their ultimate egregious error.  Lytton calls FPSD a “judicial invention,”158 but 
in fact courts that invoke the doctrine see it as emblematic of judicial restraint.159 To cure the 
defects he sees in FPSD, Lytton concludes that “[s]imply overturning [FPSD] . . . would be 
justified, easy, and well within the legitimate powers of the courts.”160 Lytton thus promotes 
abandoning a common law rule intimately linked to the distinction between private and public 
 
155 See, e.g., Local Government Assistance, State Court and Fees for Justice Courts for Offenses Committed After 
December 31, 2005, http://www.window.state.tx.us/lga/courtcosts06/3.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2006) (describing 
fees for services of peace officers, including arrest fees and warrant fees).  
156 See, e.g., Marla A. Goldberg, Suspect Denies Slaying Bruno, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield, MA), Dec. 28, 2005, 
at A1 (stating that two men convicted in federal court of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering venture were 
ordered to pay about $31,000 to cover prison costs); Mafia Boss Ordered to Pay Prison Costs, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 
11, 2005, at A3 (“A federal judge Friday ordered the former head of the New England Mafia to reimburse the 
government almost $120,000 for the cost of his eight years in prison.”).  
157 The goal of the common law is corrective justice, or righting wrongs between the parties at bar, not distributive 
justice, or ensuring that the community’s resources are distributed in a just manner given political considerations.  
See Ernest J. Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at 204-231. 
158 Lytton, supra note 10, at 780. 
159 See, e.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. 1976) (“It has been stated that ‘It 
cannot be a tort for government to govern.’”). 
160 Lytton, supra note 10, at 780. 
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law.161 How can this be done by a “restrained” court?162 Similarly, Wendy Wagner has argued 
that gun litigation is a way of overcoming "stubborn information problems" and reaping 
"regulatory benefits" not obtainable through the legislative process.163 It is difficult to see what 
this has to do with judicial restraint, the Rule of Law, or tort.   
This wolf-in-sheep's clothing approach (judicial activism under the guise of judicial 
restraint) may in fact characterize much of Professor Lytton's scholarship.  Lytton has made 
radical, tort-transforming arguments in support of suits against the firearms industry: 
"The military strategist Karl von Clausewitz asserted that war is a continuation of 
politics by other means.  The same might be said of gun litigation . . . 164 
"[C]ourts should play a secondary role in policy-making that complements the 
regulatory efforts of legislatures and administrative agencies . . . [subject to] more 
focused legislative responses to litigation, where legislatures disagree with the 
policy implications of particular judicial decisions165 
"[but the] legislature should do so in a restrained way, one that respects the 
preeminence of courts in shaping tort doctrine and preserves the regulatory 
benefits of tort litigation166 
"[M]ore focused responses promote the integrity of tort doctrine, respect the 
separation of powers, and preserve a regulatory role for the courts.167 
161 See Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, supra note 26, at 653-54. 
162 In fact, Lytton dislikes the free public services doctrine so much that he is apparently indifferent as to just which 
party -- the courts or the legislature -- should take the lead in ending it.  He argues at one point that judges should 
abolish the doctrine (leaving the legislature free to reestablish it by statute if desired) and at another that the doctrine 
“should be replaced with a statutory scheme that generally allows government to sue in tort for public service 
expenditures subject to specific exceptions.”  Lytton, supra note 10, at 780. 
163 Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, in LYTTON, SUING 
THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 271. 
164 LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 152. 
165 Id. at 153. 
166 Id. at 170. 
167 Id. at 170. 
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IV. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES DOCTRINE: FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS 
AND COMPARISONS 
This article has heretofore chipped away at the arguments employed by the critics of 
FPSD.  It is now time to pass from the defense to the offense.  FPSD criticism, it turns out, is 
biased, inefficient, and unprincipled. 
 A. What's Incorporation Got To Do With It? 
Dean Prosser described FPSD thus: “The state can never sue in tort in its political or 
governmental capacity, although as the owner of property it may resort to the same tort actions 
as any individual proprietor to recover for injuries to the property or to recover the property 
itself.”168 So FPSD is not, on its face, confined to damages caused by corporate tortfeasors.   
Yet in the introduction to his argument against FPSD Lytton affirms that “[t]he [free 
public services] doctrine shields industrial tortfeasors from liability for cleanup costs, passing 
these costs on to the public.  It constitutes a tort subsidy to industry and functions as an insurance 
scheme for industrial accidents.”169 He elsewhere pronounces that, “[i]n many instances, the 
doctrine lets industrial tortfeasors off the hook for forest fires, oil spills, and airline crashes and 
makes taxpayers pay the cleanup costs,”170 and that FPSD is an “undesirable tort subsidy to 
careless industries.”171 He flatly charges courts that have applied the doctrine with “pro-industry 
168 PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 2, p.7 (5th ed. 1984).  Prosser is describing an underlying rule of tort, although he 
does not explicitly label it as “the free public services doctrine.”  Prosser notes that the rule governs municipal 
corporations as well as states.  Id. at n.7.  Lytton’s refusal to recognize this underlying rule is what leads him to 
conclude that only ten states recognize the doctrine – other states simply decline to use the label.  See, e.g., County 
of Champaign v. Anthony, 337 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (quoting Prosser in affirming dismissal of 
county’s lawsuit against criminal defendant for cost of protecting witness who testified against him at trial). 
169 Lytton, supra note 10, at 730 (emphasis added). 
170 Id. at 759 (emphasis added). 
171 Id. at 781 (emphasis added). 
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bias.”172 Relying on these arguments, a recent New Jersey decision refused to apply FPSD to 
reject a city's suit against a gun manufacturer because of the "unfairness" of allowing corporate 
tortfeasors to use public services the same way that private citizens do.173 
Anti-FPSD citations refer overwhelmingly to corporate defendants, be they chemical 
companies,174 railroads175 or firearm manufacturers176 Yet one might ask, what's incorporation 
got to do with this problem? Much government assistance targets individual victims who have 
either negligently caused their own peril, or who have been injured by other culpable individuals.  
From Coast Guard rescue of careless boaters to welfare benefits for single mothers to helicopter 
 
172 Id. at 759 (emphasis added). 
173 James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 48-49 (N.J. Super. 2003). 
174 E.g., in note 2 Lytton cites to: Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999) (reversing 
summary judgment for defendant oil company in suit by cities to recover costs for cleanup of Exxon Valdez oil 
spill); Mayor & Council of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding 
judgment for city for property damage resulting from chemical fire, but denying recovery for costs to city of fighting 
the fire); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. 1976) (affirming denial of recovery for costs 
incurred by municipal fire department in containing oil spill); and City of Pittsburgh v.  Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 
83 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1986) (affirming dismissal of city suit to recover costs of deploying police to the scene of 
gas pipeline explosion).  In note 3 Lytton cites to In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding liability of oil and shipbuilding companies for oil spill at sea). 
175 In note 2, Lytton cites Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1974) (reversing summary 
judgment to plaintiff town for recovery of fire-fighting costs resulting from railroad negligence).  In note 3 he cites: 
City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary 
judgment for railroad in suit by city for recovery of emergency costs expended following derailment); Allenton 
Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (dismissing fire department’s suit to 
recover costs of fighting fires caused by defendant railroad); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 547 
F.2d 1101 (10th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery for firefighting costs and damage to federal land negligently caused 
by defendant railroad, but disallowing recovery for overhead of firefighting program); United States v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Ry. Co., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1942) (reversing dismissal of suit against negligent railroad to recover costs 
for fire suppression in national forest); and United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980) 
(denying railroad’s motion to dismiss suit by government to recover costs for removal of abandonded bridge piers). 
176 In note 5 Lytton cites: City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d. 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(dismissing city’s and civic organizations’ negligence and public nuisance claims against gun manufacturer for 
expenses incurred as a result of gun violence), aff’d on other grounds, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim v. Smith 
& Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), aff’d, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (affirming 
dismissal of public nuisance suit by mayor and city against gun manufacturers and distributors for costs incurred 
related to gun violence); Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (dismissing with 
prejudice suit of Miami-Dade County against gun manufacturers to recover costs of emergency services provided in 
response to gun violence); and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P15, 880 (Oh. Ct. 
App. 2000) (affirming dismissal of city’s lawsuit to recover from gun distributor and manufacturers the costs of 
emergency services arising from gun violence). 
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hoistings of those who don’t evacuate, government rescue is at least as much a response to 
individual misfortune as to corporate tort.   
Perhaps FPSD opponents believe that courts only invoke FPSD in suits filed by 
governments against large, financially solvent corporations for recoupment of rescue costs.  Such 
a belief would be untrue.  Governmental entities rarely attempt to recoup the cost of services 
from individual tortfeasors, both because of limits on solvency and because of reluctance to sue 
one's voters in tort, but this political reality does not affect the content of the underlying tort 
doctrine.  A solvent (i.e., insured) individual’s negligence can certainly result in the expenditure 
of thousands or even millions of dollars of public rescue services.  In 1987 a small Texas town 
spared no expense to save a child who had fallen down an abandoned well because of negligent 
parental supervision – and there was no evidence that the parents were unable to pay for her 
rescue, though no reimbursement was sought.177 Nor is it clear that those who stand behind 
individual tortfeasors are incapable of indemnifying fire departments when careless smoking sets 
their homes ablaze.  In 2002, a federal forest service employee carelessly burned a letter at a 
campground in a National Forest, resulting in $52 million in losses; her wealthy government 
employer could have reimbursed local firefighters under respondeat superior.178 The apocryphal 
insured motorist who negligently caused an accident on the George Washington Bridge during 
rush hour may have enough coverage to pay for the huge outlay of state police overtime services 
to re-route traffic.  But of course, motorists are never sued by governments to recoup these 
 
177 The mother and aunt of Jessica McClure, who fell down a well in her aunt’s backyard in Midland, Texas in 1987, 
were determined by the state human services agency to have been negligently supervising the girl at the time of the 
accident.  Associated Press, Report Criticizes 2 Relatives in Child’s Fall in Texas Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1988, 
at A18.  If the McClure family did not at the time have sufficient resources to pay for the rescue services received, it 
certainly did after the event was over.  A $1 million trust fund was formed for Jessica’s benefit from donations 
received from people around the world who learned of her ordeal in the media.  Chip Brown, “Baby Jessica” Adapts 
to Living Normal Life as a First-Grader, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at A1. 
178 Howard Pankratz, Government May Be Liable: Federal Worker’s Role in Fire Opens Legal Avenues, Experts 
Say, DENVER POST, June 18, 2002, at A6. 
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expenses – correctly, because recoupment suits have no basis in tort law. FPSD opponents never 
explain why tort law should treat corporations differently. 
One possible distinction between corporate and individual demands on services is that it 
would be "inefficient" to encourage small recoupment claims against individuals, and that for 
this reason only significant corporate wrongdoing should set off an exception to FPSD.  But 
Lytton himself points out that governments have occasionally launched (unsuccessful) tort suits 
to recoup small sums from corporations.179 In 1986 Pittsburgh sued Equitable Gas Company for 
$1,185.70 in public expenditures following a natural gas explosion.180 In 1987 the Township of 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, sued Conti Construction in a vain effort to recover $4,220.80, the 
estimated cost of police overtime pay to evacuate a neighborhood after a Conti employee 
negligently ruptured a gas line.181 In 1984, the State of New York unsuccessfully sued the Long 
Island Lighting Company for $5,263.18 in expenses incurred to divert traffic from a stretch of 
road onto which power lines had negligently been  allowed to fall.182 Governments arguably 
chose to sue corporations, as opposed to individual citizens, for small sums, for political reasons, 
not for efficiency reasons. 
Are these small-scale lawsuits rational?  Why would New York State, Pittsburgh, or 
Cherry Hill take a company to court to recover a small amount of money, surely less money than 
it costs to file and prosecute the claims?  In addition to the obvious “public choice” explanation 
for this phenomenon,183 two other possible justifications for these suits come to mind.  Perhaps 
local and state governments have an “all shoplifters will be prosecuted” policy; that is, perhaps 
 
179 All three cases discussed here are cited by Lytton, supra note 10 at 729 n.2. 
180 City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). 
181 Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Construction Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) 
182 New York v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. Nassau Co. Ct. 1985) 
183 Companies can't vote; company money is "new money" brought into government coffers, and replaces individual 
tax dollars, thereby allowing for a lessened tax load on those who do vote. 
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they try to take all public-service-incurring tortfeasors to court, no matter the value of the claim, 
as a deterrent to negligent action causing governmental loss.  Alternatively, government entities 
may be attempting to make an example out of a particular defendant, perhaps because prior 
unsatisfactory behavior has demonstrated that the company in question is a "bad apple."  But 
neither of these possible justifications can be easily reconciled with the fact that governments' 
tort lawyers seemingly ignore claims on their resources by individual tortfeasors, many of whom 
are surely known to be generally bad citizens. 
Another argument distinguishing individual from corporate beneficiaries of public 
services is that the former create problems the state is meant to resolve, while the latter cause 
exceptional harm that goes beyond the legitimate scope of free public services. McIntyre writes:  
[A]s a practical matter it would not be cost-effective for a government entity to entangle 
itself in an expensive lawsuit for the relatively small costs incurred in responding to 
minor emergencies such as car crashes and small home fires that are not properly 
characterized as disasters.184 
Under this rationale, corporations are “different” from physical persons, and deserve 
distinctive tort treatment, essentially because they are not citizens. Judgments from New Jersey 
and Massachusetts have alluded to an alleged public policy rationale behind spreading the risk of 
emergency services away from individual persons: “[I]t would be too burdensome to charge all 
who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with 
public funds to deal with those inevitable, although negligently created, occurrences.”185 In 
essence, this argument is that "efficiency" requires collective sharing of losses caused by 
individuals, not corporations.  This reinforces the impression that those who defend municipal-
 
184 McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1018 n.102. 
185 Township of Cherry Hill, 527 A.2d at 922 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274 (1960)).  This quotation 
was also cited in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *33. 
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cost recovery suits are more concerned with transferring resources from corporations to 
governments than with the theory of FPSD itself. 
This preoccupation with corporate liability leads Lytton to argue that FPSD “unjustifiably 
favors [corporate] tortfeasors who harm government as compared to those who harm private 
parties.”186 If a corporation negligently damages a private party’s property through, e.g., an oil 
spill, the corporation will be held liable in tort for the damage caused to that party.187 But if the 
same negligent corporate act “harms” the government by "requiring" it to expend money to 
deploy emergency equipment and cleanup crews to the private party's home, the corporation is 
not liable to the government, a result Lytton believes is unfair and irrational.188 The mistake here 
should be obvious, however.  The harm the individual suffers in Lytton’s first example is direct,
not mediated as is the public service expense in helping clean up the individual's property.  
Lytton concedes that directly harmed public property will also be indemnified in tort: if the 
negligent oil spill pollutes City Hall, the city will recover damages from the spiller under current 
tort law.189 No discrimination in favor of corporations is involved here.  The "problem" here is 
not FPSD – it is tort law's proximate causation requirement, and as shown above, it is a non-
problem. 
Instead of comparing the potential liability of a corporate tortfeasor that has directly 
harmed a private plaintiff with a corporate tortfeasor that has indirectly “harmed” government, a 
logical study would compare the fate of a corporate tortfeasor that has indirectly “harmed” 
government with an individual tortfeasor who has similarly indirectly “harmed” government. 
Under the anti-FPSD rationale employed by the New Jersey Superior Court in James v. Arms 
 
186 Lytton, supra note 10, at 759. 
187 Id.
188 At least the corporation would not be liable for the emergency costs.  Lytton acknowledges that negligent 
tortfeasors may be required to repay governments for damage to real or chattel property.  Id. at 743. 
189 Id. at 743. 
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Tech.,190 a chemical company whose plant explodes due to its negligence should be liable for the 
costs of deployment of the municipal fire department to extinguish the blaze.191 Yet a negligent 
homeowner who requires the services of the same fire department after falling asleep while 
smoking is not liable for firefighting costs.192 Yet, to paraphrase the court, given the existence of 
a "repeated course of conduct on [the part of smokers], requiring [a municipality] to expend 
substantial governmental funds on a continuous basis," why the disparity?193 
The cost incurred by a municipality in extinguishing a given fire is not a function of the 
corporate status of the fire-setter.  As noted above, it might not be cost-effective for the 
government to attempt to recover from every homeowner.  But governments regularly devote 
considerable resources to the profitable collection of small sums of money (such as traffic fines) 
from individuals.  In the aggregate, small, routine rescues of individuals, such as sending out fire 
trucks for negligently caused automobile accidents, may well absorb the lion’s share of a fire 
company’s budget.194 Imagine that a homeowner negligently allows natural gas to leak into his 
home, resulting in an explosion that causes neighboring houses to catch fire.  This homeowner 
would be liable to his neighbors under current tort doctrine,195 yet would not be pursued by the 
 
190 James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. 2003). 
191 Lytton states: “Getting rid of the doctrine would allow government entities to recover from tortfeasors the costs 
of services such as fire suppression, environmental cleanup, and rescue operations.”  Lytton, supra note 10, at 768. 
192 As Lytton believes that eliminating the free public services doctrine with regard to corporations “would not open 
the door to unlimited liability or unleash a flood of claims” (id. at 750), he presumably envisions allowing only 
government suits to recover the costs of the relatively large emergency expenditures typically caused by 
corporations, rather than the more numerous lesser costs of services provided to negligent individuals. 
193 James, 820 A.2d at 48-49. 
194 Consider the experience of park rangers in Yosemite National Park.  While rescuing mountain climbers is quite 
costly due to the equipment and training required, the number of such rescues is only about 15 percent of the total 
number of rescues each year.  The vast majority of search and rescue missions are for lost hikers, a comparatively 
cheap task per rescue.  According to a ranger, “Climber rescues are more expensive because of helicopters, but we 
do spend more money on rescuing hikers.”  See Clare Noonan, Rescuing Climbers Raises Questions of Who Should 
Pay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 21, 2002, at C-7. 
195 But see Ryan v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 211 (1866) (stating that the party negligently causing a fire 
is liable for damage only to the closest building to which the fire spreads, not all buildings that may be damaged); 
and Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 352 (1870) (holding a railroad may be liable for fire damage directly 
caused by sparks from a passing train, but that additional damage resulting from the fire spreading from building to 
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municipality for the costs of extinguishing the blaze.196 Is this "unfair"?  Opponents of FPSD 
don't seem to think so. Why is there unfairness when the tortfeasor is a corporation? 
Stripped of anti-corporate bias, the real question is whether it is unjust that a tortfeasor is 
held liable for direct but not for mediated damages.  Should there be a point at which 
corporations and individuals should be liable for expenditures by a fire department, perhaps if an 
unusually large number of firefighters (as compared to the number required to douse an 
“average” fire) must respond to a call? Should it matter that a government provides these 
services, as a service (not a subsidy) to all (corporate and individual) legitimate197 stakeholders 
in society? An anarcho-capitalistic argument could of course be made for eliminating 
government services,198 but FPSD opponents do not seem motivated by anarcho-capitalist 
theories.   
 
B. Flawed Distributional Claims
FPSD opponents seem to feel that the doctrine unfairly acts as liability insurance for 
corporations, insurance for which “industry tends to get far more risk reduction and pay 
 
building was not recoverable).  The Supreme Court noted in Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 
(1876), that Ryan and Kerr “have been the subject of much criticism since they were decided” and that the rule they 
stood for had not been widely accepted. 
196 Negligently caused forest fires may be an exception to this trend in that individuals, as well as companies, are 
apparently sometimes billed or sued for reimbursement for fire-suppression expenses.  Ted Cilwick, Cost of 
Fighting Fires in Wild Sparks Bills for Reimbursement, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at A5. 
197 Though most agree that the government should provide services to citizens, many feel that these services should 
not be extended to illegal immigrants.  An example of this sentiment is California Proposition 187, passed in 1994.  
The proposition demanded that the state withhold many social services, including public education and emergency 
room care, from illegal immigrants.  Though the proposition passed by almost a 2-1 margin, federal courts restrained 
implementation.  Gregorio T. By and Through Jose T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995).  A recently-passed 
Georgia law had been compared to California Proposition 187.  See Rick Lyman, Georgia Immigration Law Broad,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 14, 2006, at A3 (describing the recently-passed law that will take effect on July 1, 2007, 
and that will deny state benefits, including welfare and Medicaid, to those who cannot prove they are in the country 
legally).   
198 See, generally, DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: A GUIDE TO RADICAL CAPITALISM (Open 
Court 1989); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (Collier 1978). 
Public Services Meet Private Law   ©Michael I. Krauss 2006 Page 46 of 53 
 46 
proportionally less for . . . than [do] average citizens.”199 Lytton calls this system “distributively 
unfair”200 and claims -- without referring to data to support his position -- that “citizens are cross-
subsidizing [sic] industry.”201 The alleged subsidization occurs because corporate taxes are not 
experience-rated: i.e., there is no direct relationship between the taxes paid by corporations and 
risks created by these corporations.202 
Lytton does concede, in passing, that corporations are required to finance, through 
corporate and property taxes, public services from which they are intrinsically unable to benefit -
- such as public education and welfare benefits.  But he dismisses these instances of industry-to-
individual “subsidization” as unworthy of his attention, because they are “products of legislative 
decisions, not tort subsidies created by common law judges.”203 Though this type of "subsidy" 
“may be just as distributively unfair as the free public services doctrine’s cross-subsidization of 
industry by citizens,” Lytton opines that the legislature’s blessing bestows upon these forced 
subsidies “a level of democratic legitimacy.”204 
Like other taxpayers, corporations pay income taxes used in part for transfer payments.  
Corporations pay property taxes that fund municipal services to individuals.205 Corporations pay 
other taxes for which they directly recoup little, such as Social Security and unemployment 
 
199 Lytton, supra note 10, at 764. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Obviously, if a municipality's expenses rose greatly because of an accident, a hike in taxes might be required, and 
if a corporation pays a significant percentage of the municipality's taxes that corporation will bear the costs of this 
tax increase.  But the municipality will not be allowed to increase the taxes of the corporation alone.  Allowing a 
discriminatory tax hike is, in essence, the gist of Lytton's proposal. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 765. 
205 Corporations pay property taxes even though these are considered to be mostly “benefits based,” that is, the 
benefits received by the taxpayer in exchange for taxes paid are allegedly relatively closely related.  See HERBERT 
KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOODS: A WELFARE-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 182 
(University of Michigan 1992).  Property taxes are often the single-largest source of revenue for cities.  This is so, 
for example, for New York City, which received 40% of its budget from property taxes in fiscal year 2002.  CITY OF 
N.Y. DEP’T OF FINANCE OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXPENDITURES FY 2002 at 5, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/pdf/01pdf/taxexpend_02.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
Public Services Meet Private Law   ©Michael I. Krauss 2006 Page 47 of 53 
 47 
levies.  Indeed, corporations are believed to generate, directly and indirectly, so many positive 
tax externalities that local governments compete to entice them to relocate to their communities. 
Municipal "tax holidays" are circumstantial corroboration that corporations provide net positive 
tax externalities ex ante.206 
Tellingly, in a footnote Lytton makes an important concession that undermines his 
argument that FPSD is illegitimate corporate welfare.  He writes:  
Empirical data comparing public expenditures occasioned by industry to public 
expenditures occasioned by individuals is unavailable.  Thus, claims of cross-
subsidization are admittedly speculative.  Such claims are, however, not unlikely given 
the relatively higher risk posed by industrial accidents when compared to accidents 
caused by individuals.207 
It turns out that the “subsidization” claim is based on social costs (the cost of industrial 
accidents), but not on social benefits (the positive neighborhood effects attributable to the 
corporation) that result from the operation of a company.  "Speculating" that FPSD results in a 
net subsidy to corporations, without looking at the benefits of the corporate form, is academic 
“junk social science.”208 
C. Flawed Allocative Claim
206 See, e.g., Peralte C. Paul, Big Push Won DaimlerChrysler, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 20, 2002, at 1F; Peter 
Behr, To Lure Jobs, States Surrender Key Tax Returns, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at A1; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, 
States in No-Holds-Barred Battle to Attract New Jobs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 31, 1995, at 3. 
207 See Lytton, supra note 10, at 764 n.177 (emphasis added). 
208 Under the standard of evidence laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, “in order to qualify as 
‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.”  509 U.S. 579, 590 
(1993).  The factors used by a court to determine if evidence is admissible as scientific or technical knowledge 
include whether the knowledge has been or can be tested, whether the methodology at issue has been subject to peer 
review and publication, and whether the technique used to acquire the knowledge is generally accepted.  Id. at 593-
94.  Lytton’s discussion on subsidization would not pass such a test. 
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The distributive argument for revocation of FPSD is speculative.   Not to worry, for 
FPSD critics are capable of changing tack completely to promote corporate liability for public 
services as efficient “loss-spreading,” unlike municipal taxation, which constitutes inefficient, 
compulsory insurance.209 Lytton writes:  
[W]hen government passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt 
out of the insurance scheme.  As long as government finances public services, the free 
public services doctrine will compel taxpayers to participate in a loss-spreading scheme 
that insures against liability for the cost of public services.210 
There are two problems with this poor imitiation of Judge Posner. First, it impliedly 
excludes corporations from the category of “taxpayers.”  As noted, such an exclusion is 
groundless since there is no data supporting the contention that corporate taxpayers are not 
similarly or even more acutely impoverished by the coercive “group insurance” of publicly 
financed services.  Secondly, without full fee-for-service privatization of all social services, 
which FPSD critics neither advocate nor support, some will always pay more, or less, than a “fair 
share” for public services.211 It is of the essence of a tax that its payment be coercive.  It can be 
argued that a corporate citizen that has never suffered an accidental fire, explosion, chemical 
spill, or other large-scale disaster is "inefficiently" subsidizing paramedic, fire, and police 
insurance for the small minority of individuals who consume the majority of EMTs', fire 
departments' and police forces' time – but such an argument would be specious, because it is 
unclear what "inefficiently" means in this context.  Why is payment of “forced insurance” by 
corporations not "inefficient" to FPSD opponents?  They do not provide any theory of efficiency 
 
209 Lytton, supra note 10, at 763. 
210 Id. at 764. 
211 Even privatized and fully competitive insurance markets will result in unequal distribution of costs and benefits 
ex post, though of course not ex ante if premiums are actuarially set. 
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or of politics that would explain why a net payment in one direction, but not in the other, is 
"inefficient." Nor do they ever discuss the communitarian premises which arguably underly the 
notion of public services. Communitarian ideals might in fact compel general payment of 
“natural monopoly” public goods, trumping any efficiency claim.212 Is it "inefficient" for the 
majority to pay for police protection of an embattled minority that frequently needs police 
protection, yet doesn't pay its "fair share"?  Without discussion of such issues as "equal 
protection", "due process" and "republican form of government", arguments against FPSD on 
grounds of efficient insurance are whistles in the dark.  
 
D. Voluntary Products Liability "Insurance" vs. Involuntary Public
Services "Insurance"
Noting that “[l]oss spreading elsewhere in the law of torts involves voluntary 
participation of those in the risk pool,”213 FPSD opponents contrast the “voluntary” insurance 
scheme resulting from corporate liability for defective products with the “involuntary” loss-
spreading required by payment of public services through taxes.  For example, Lytton asserts that 
under products liability, “the cost of purchasing the insurance is included in the price of the 
product."214 This makes the insurance "voluntary."  "By contrast," Lytton claims, "when 
government passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt out of the 
insurance scheme.”215 
This comparison misunderstands not only the nature of public services, but also the 
insurance element of products liability law, which is "voluntary" in a most unusual way.  
 
212 See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 137, at 320-23 (noting that allowing individuals in a community to opt out of 
“equal sharing” of the restrictions and burdens of the community might change the character of the community).
213 Lytton, supra note 10, at 763.
214 Id. at 764. 
215 Id. 
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Consumers may not currently give up their rights to sue manufacturers in products liability in 
exchange for lower prices; they may “opt out” of products liability “insurance” only by refusing 
to buy the products themselves – a virtual impossibility for some goods and a very inefficient 
bundling for most others.216 Similarly, producers may opt out of product liability law only by 
ceasing to produce, not by offering less insurance at a lower price.  In addition, when products 
are purchased, all purchasers pay the same “insurance premium” as a component of the product 
price, regardless of the individual risk created by each consumer's particular use of the 
product.217 This is the same “coercion” and "cross-subsidization" (sic) that Lytton believes is 
unjustly generated by FPSD. But the same bundling exists for public services.  Taxpayers can 
decide to fund more or less services through tax dollars, or they can refuse to fund them at all 
(providing for them in the private market); or they can move to another jurisdiction with 
different tax preferences; or they can decline to earn income (avoiding income tax) or purchase 
goods (avoiding sales tax).  In neither product liability law nor public finance is there a “clean” 
insurance market with individually determined and agreed-upon premiums for specific risks.  In 
the end, the “involuntary” nature of FPSD matters if (and only if) public provision of rescue 
services is itself fundamentally unjust.218 
FPSD opponents declare that the doctrine is an inefficient way to provide insurance, and 
that “[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage most high-risk entities to purchase private 
 
216 See Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory:  One More Trip to the Choice-of-Law Well, [2002] 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 759 at 802-15. 
217 Some consumers use their ladders daily, others only once a year.  Additionally, some users are risk-averse while 
others are reckless.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-92 (1972) (discussing 
relation of liability rules to level of care exercised by consumers). 
218 Lytton's argument about corporations not paying their “fair share” for rescue services becomes even less 
intelligible when one considers that corporations do not actually “pay” taxes.  In fact, the cost of corporate taxes is 
passed on to employees, in the form of lower wages, or corporate shareholders, in the form of lower dividends.  See, 
e.g., MARIAN KRZYZANIAK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963). 
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insurance.”219 This implies that companies do not currently purchase "enough" insurance, 
because they expect FPSD to protect them from liability in the event of a negligently-caused 
disaster.  As a matter of fact, insurance coverage is specifically mentioned in several of the cases 
cited by FPSD opponents.  For example, after the oil tanker Cadiz ran aground in 1978, Amoco’s 
insurance company told the French government that it could not on its own handle the cleanup of 
such a large oil spill, but that the company would reimburse France for “reasonable costs” 
incurred by France in the cleanup on Amoco’s behalf.220 Following the terms of an international 
convention on pollution damage to which France was a party, Amoco paid the maximum 
recovery amount for such incidents -- 77 million Francs (about $16 million) -- into a fund for the 
French government to apply toward cleanup costs.221 The French government, however, thought 
this sum insufficient and sued (in American courts, bien sûr) to obtain additional funds.222 It is 
hard to see why it should be assumed that Amoco was “underinsured” when the company made 
arrangements to pay the statutory maximum allowed for such a disaster.  If the statutory 
maximum was insufficient, that cap -- not tort law’s free public services doctrine -- needs to be 
changed. 
Insurance coverage was also an issue in Fontenot.223 The two corporations involved in 
the explosion and fire “stipulated liability, not to exceed the limits of liability in the applicable 
insurance policies.”224 Although defendants had policies at various coverage levels with five 
different insurance companies, the city chose to sue only the two firms from which the insureds 
 
219 Lytton, supra note 10, at 766. 
220 In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). 
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Morgan City v. Fontenot, 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984) 
224 Id. at 686. 
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had purchased “excess coverage.”225 The court explained the move this way: “Apparently, the 
limits of liability of the other insurers had been expended in satisfaction of other claims.”226 If 
that was the case, it can hardly be argued that the defendants had inadequate insurance; after all, 
they had not themselves exhausted the limits of liability on all of their policies.  Rather, the city 
seemed to want to convert the insured's “excess coverage” into social insurance, so long as the 
money came from an outside insurer and not a local firm.   
V. Conclusion
FPSD opponents maintain that the free public services doctrine "does not have 
particularly deep roots in the common law, dating back only to the 1970s.”227 As this article has 
demonstrated, FPSD is in fact an ancient doctrine  What opponents see as “antecedents” to FPSD 
-- cases involving unsuccessful tort claims against criminals for the cost of their capture and 
imprisonment,228 or failed suits by the federal government to recover economic losses resulting 
from injury by a tortfeasor to soldiers,229 -- are in fact nothing but particular applications of duty, 
proximate cause and economic harm  theories. 
This article has situated FPSD as a sound and timeless application of existing common 
law doctrines. Those who oppose FPSD resort to “policy analysis” motivated by an inchoate and 
uninformed bias against corporations. Their claim that FPSD “inefficiently externalizes the costs 
of tortfeasors’ wrongdoing”230 fails, as does their assertion that the doctrine is “distributively 
unfair.”231 Their conclusion that “[a]bandoning the doctrine would end an undesirable tort 
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subsidy to careless industries and place an appropriate limit on judicial loss spreading . . .”232 is 
untenable.233 
This article also defended FPSD from the unjust accusation that it represents "judicial 
activism." Critics fail to explain why judges’ application of traditional common law doctrines of 
duty and proximate causation is "activism," while judicial overthrow of these doctrines on 
unproven "policy" grounds and in the name of an inchoate "efficiency" would not be activism.  
In fact, such a dramatic upheaval would be aberrant for the common law.  Common law judges 
examine the issues before them in a case with no pre-conceived ideas about launching policy 
“reform” efforts when the right case comes along.234 
The free public services doctrine is a brick mortared to the walls of the Proximate 
Causation, Duty and Economic Loss rules.  Its critics fail to see the doctrine's intrinsic link to the 
common law of tort. The failings of their arguments give us reason to applaud, not to condemn, 
the free public services doctrine. 
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